Just as shariʿa (Islamic law) has been demonized globally, so too, paradoxically, have governments sought to appropriate Islamic authority for secular rule. Based on nineteen months of field research in northwest China, this article offers some preliminary thoughts on the ways in which the party-state manipulates shariʿa for purposes of rule. Through the example of the China Islamic Association, an organization constituted under the Chinese Communist Party in 1953, the author argues that the party-state's evolving relationship to Islamic authority demonstrates what he calls the "postsecular." Rather than discursively demarcating (legitimate) secular law from (illegitimate) religious law, the China Islamic Association has, since 2001, a watershed year in the relationship between secular and Islamic authority, sought to expound law from the revealed sources of Islam that are congruent with Chinese socialism and nationalism.
Introduction
In his Public Religions in the Modern World, sociologist José Casanova argues that religions have undergone a process he calls "deprivatization" (1994, 6) , the (re)emergence of faith in the public sphere, traditionally understood in modernization theory as the realm of deliberative rationality. Eminent philosopher Charles Taylor, however, claims that we inhabit a secular age, defined by the decentering of God in the public sphere, the decline of belief in the transcendent, and the engendering of "new Erie 89 Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 12 (September 2014) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-12) conditions of belief" ([2007] 2009, 20) . On the one hand, an empirically rich and globespanning study heralds religious revival; on the other hand, a leading philosopher meditates on the eclipsing of the sacred by the secular. How to make sense of these two views? Should they be reconciled? And why would such an accommodation matter?
German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas provides a third and intermediary view in his remarkable essay "Notes on a Post-Secular Society," in which the champion of rationalism observes a change in global consciousness through the experience of religion (2008) . Casanova, Taylor, and Habermas each offer a different critique of modernization theory, the presumption that modernity-as secularism, rationality, and science-supplants primordial affections. Habermas's essay demonstrates that what he terms the "post-secular" may share affinities with the novel and creative forms of thought and being that Taylor defines as secular, but that coexist and perhaps even depend on resurgent faiths.
Each of the writings focuses on the issue of religion in the West. In particular, the arguments are premised on the political philosophy of Western liberalism and democratic institutions. Law plays an important role in mediating relations between the state and religion in this model. Liberalism has traditionally been equated with universal rights that are negative (i.e., held against the state) and borne by the individual as rights holder (Bobbio 1996) . That is, through law, citizens limit the state's power to intrude on their capacity to cultivate their own cultured identity, as expressed in the aspiration "the separation of church and state." Multiculturalists, neo-Marxists, culture critics, and anthropologists, however, have chipped away at the edifice of liberalism and its assumptions (Kymlicka 1989 (Kymlicka , [1996 (Kymlicka ] 2001 Turner 1994; Brownlie 1995; Tully 1995; Gledhill 1997; Thompson 1997; Niezen 2003) . The transformative processes observed by Casanova, Taylor, and Habermas, and particularly the expansion of the domain of religions beyond the state-sanctioned private sphere, suggest categorical confusion regarding where the line between "secular" and "non-", "a-", or "postsecular" is drawn.
Most strikingly, it is not just state law that shapes the relationship between the state and religion but also evolving interpretations of religious or non-state law that have emerged from primordialism to color the postsecular. The religious law most commonly associated with challenges to secularism is that of Islam. 1 A wellspring of studies has demonstrated the normative, ethical, and legal pluralism practiced by Muslim minorities living in Western states (Ramadan 1999; Emon 2006 Emon , 2007 Maurer 2006; Ramadan 2008; Fadel 2009; Rohe 2009; Christoffersen 2010) .
A touchstone of analysis among the literature on Muslim minorities is the status of shariʿa 2 under state law, especially in the areas of what civil law terms "personal status,"
or what common law in the Anglo-American tradition calls "family law" (Pearl and Menski 1998; Ferrari and Bradney 2000; Rohe 2007; Bowen 2011; Macfarlane 2012 ).
One of the world's leading experts on shariʿa, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im has advocated the position that Muslims (minority or majority) can pursue their conviction to abide by shariʿa only under a secular state (An-Na'im 2008a , 2008b . Professor AnNa'im argues that the secular state, which he defines as one that maintains neutrality toward any single religious doctrine or creed, guarantees freedom of individual choice (An-Na'im 2008a, 4).
Professor An-Na'im's thesis is compelling, but how does the argument for the necessity of a secular state as guarantor of religious freedom hold up against Habermas's assertion that we have entered a postsecular age? The neutrality of states vis-à-vis religion and religious law has been eroded in the post-9/11 era (Leigh and Ahdar 2012) .
The reduction of Islam to extremism and fundamentalism, whether in the most intimate matters (e.g., male domination in marital relations) or in the public sphere, as most acutely perceived in the threat of terrorism, is not only an effect of media and its misrepresentations but of state policy and law, domestic and international. Everywhere, the state seems to show its preferences, whether in the French government's ban of head scarves in public schools (Bowen 2007) or the U.S. government's support of faith-based initiatives (Wuthnow 2006) . Indeed, following religious laws' blurring of the private and public domains, many states have moved from a stance of neutrality to one of actively manipulating non-state laws, practices, and customs, particularly of minority populations, to legitimize rule (see, e.g., Povinelli 2002) .
I argue that the shift from the state's defining itself against religion to operationalizing religion as a form of governance lies at the heart of the postsecular. In recent years, there has been a sea change in writings in anthropology investigating "the secular," "secularism," "the postsecular," and "postsecularism" (Asad 2003; Mahmood 2006; Ferrara 2009; Agrama 2012) . While Talal Asad's use of Foucault's critique of genealogies of ideas as power has gained significant purchase in anthropological circles, my approach recognizes the significance of discourse but also seeks to underscore the centrality of social relations in generating and circumscribing power, a view espoused by Weber and Marx. While the writings of Asad and others understand secularism as manipulating religion (rather than standing apart from it), the Chinese data shows a distinction between secularism (as defined against religion) and postsecularism, extending state authority through religion. Consequently, unlike Habermas's definition, which equates the postsecular with a "change in consciousness" (Habermas 2008, 20) , I
define the postsecular as a technique of rule-specifically, one that employs religion in the name of secular authority and power. While past treatments of such an approach invoke Foucault's notion of governmentality (see e.g., Ghatak and Abel 2013), I ground my understanding of the postsecular in Max Weber's thought.
Scholarship on Weber's sociology of law has emphasized his use of "ideal types."
Ideal types are taken to be characteristics of an economy in which all social behaviors are dominated by tradition, a system of ethics or religious values, or of market behavior.
Often these sources are assumed to be discrete, mutually exclusive, and even evolutionary or teleological (Rheinstein 1967, xxix) . However, Weber's writings on the "routinization of charisma" show the transformation and appropriation of diverse forms of authority (Weber [1922 (Weber [ ] 1978a . Weber finds in the Islamic qadi the embodiment of the "revolutionary nature" of charisma, as the authoritative figure of a system of theocratic justice that is both rationalized and part of an abstract natural law (Weber [1922 (Weber [ ] 1978b (Weber [ , 1116 . Similarly, of the Chinese official-scholar bureaucracy, Weber observed that much of the prestige of officialdom rested on the charisma of the high mandarins (Weber [1951 (Weber [ ] 1968 . Weber noted that traditional charisma could be rationalized to serve as the basis for the legitimacy of political and economic organization (Weber [1922 (Weber [ ] 1978a , as in the example of democracy in the United States (Weber [1922 (Weber [ ] 1978a . Thus, for Weber, the mobilization of traditional authority (whether hereditary, magical, or religious) for governance was immanent to the process of modernization. Nonetheless, in Weber's analysis, personal 
China's Islamic Renaissance
The Chinese Communist approach to Islam in general, and to shariʿa in particular, is predicated on the primacy of rule by the party and the nullification of any alternative authority. One of the earliest activities of the CCP when it began consolidating power in the early 1950s was to dismantle the remnants of Islamic institutions in northwest China. (Potter 2003, 325) . Over the past thirty years, China has experienced religious revivals of all creeds (Chau 2006 (Chau , 2011 Yang 2008; M. Yang 2011; F. Yang 2011) , including Islam 6 (Gladney [1991 (Gladney [ ] 1996 (Gladney [ , 2004b (Gladney [ , 2008 Gillette 2000 (Eickelman 1985, 125; Rosen 1989, 58) and therefore a focal point of the party-state's propaganda. As such, he is the pivot between Islamic law and state law. 
The Status of Shariʿa in the Party-State
The approach to incorporating Muslim minorities into the nation-state differs in socialist China from the model adopted by Western liberal democracies in several respects. Since China's "opening and reform" in 1978, the CCP has sought to build a "socialist rule of law" engineered not to protect individuals from state encroachment but to bolster state power through the leadership of the CCP (Wang 1997; Lubman 1999; Peerenboom 2002) . Thus, the Chinese approach to rights focuses on economic and social rights as well as group rights, rather than individual and negative rights held against the state (Svensson 1996; Bauer and Bell 1999; Potter 2001) .
One variant of group rights that the Communists adopted from the Soviets is the concept of zizhi 自治 (lit. "self-rule"), or "autonomy," as applied to China's Muslim population that resides in certain geographically concentrated areas in the northwest, including Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Autonomy has become the cornerstone of the party-state's policy on ethnic minorities and Islam (Cooke 2008) . Autonomy theoretically confers discretion to the governments of minority regions to modify national legislation in light of local conditions (Dreyer 1976; Mackerras 1994; Kaup 2000) . However, in practice, the CCP has curtailed the capacity of autonomous governments to enact legislation in accordance with religious law-for instance, shariʿa (Erie 2013) . Thus while, on their face, PRC law and policy are neutral toward Islam, the empirics suggest that neutrality, like "rule of law" itself, may operate ideologically as a form of control.
Chinese laws and regulations, in fact, do not recognize shariʿa. Rather, in the Chinese legal lexicon, the preferred term is xiguanfa, or "customary law." 8 Customary law is understood as premodern and predisposed to reproduce a set of behaviors tied to the past and to a specific group or locality (Yang 2003; Jiang 2007 Jiang , 2010 . Furthermore, ethnicized customary law plays an important ideological role as a foil to legal modernity, an aspirational marker of national progress, as engineered by the ethnically invisible Han
Chinese and the party-state. In political and academic discourse, customary law pertains to a body of rules addressing matters of diet, hygiene, and sometimes marriage and inheritance. However, the concept of customary law excludes the following: the textual traditions of shariʿa, the sacred nature of its primary sources, the Quran and the hadiths prayer, the reading of the Quran at grave sites, the practice of fidya [lit. "ransom," or atonement], and modes of prayer and remembrance). These teaching schools, including the traditionalist Gedimu, mystical Sufis, modernist Yihewani, and neoconservative Salafiyya, have historically fought against one another for membership and resources, sometimes in bloody and violent conflicts that have required state intervention (Ma [1979 (Ma [ ] 2000 . For these reasons, the CIA's mission is unity, and it promotes this mission by appropriating the texts, symbols, and authorities of Islam.
11
Most ahong in Islamic centers in the northwest, like Linxia City, for example, are members of their local IA, both at the prefectural and municipal levels. The exam to obtain an ahong certificate was historically administered by the local IA (e.g., Linxia City Islamic Association), but in 2010, in Gansu, the rule changed such that only the CIA in Beijing had the authority to administer the test, making it much more difficult to obtain a license. 15 exemplary sermons, op-eds and discussion pieces; and educational matters. Such "mediascapes" (Appadurai 1996, 35) are hardly unique to China and shape notions of ethical behavior, social responsibility, pious comportment, and devotional practice in Muslim majority states past and present. However, these mediascapes are less "counterpublics" (Hirschkind 2006, 106-107) Communist law both "make law" by following a set of precepts external to the law (i.e., the teachings of the Quran and the deeds and sayings of the Prophet, on the one hand, and the leadership of the party, on the other). Weber underscored the role of those who dominate legal thought and enforce the order that law exists to reproduce (Weber [1922] 1978b, 784-808). In the example of the ahong, a charismatic Muslim leader is the sermonizer of religious law, but one that is specifically filtered through the dictates of Chinese socialism and nationalism and state law and policy. The result is that the principles of CCP rule dominate those of Islam in shaping Chinese Muslims' shariʿa consciousness.
The Educational Guidance Committee, 2001 to 2014
To summarize, for the first fifty years of Communist rule (i.e., 1950 to 2000), the CCP adopted an approach to shariʿa that demarcated the secular state from religious societies by discursively labeling shariʿa as customary law and therefore below state law.
This approach continued into the reform era, but with economic liberalization, religious policy was also (partly) relaxed, which led to a second and different approach. Rather than engineering an opposition between state and religion, this approach began to mobilize religion as a tool of governance. Specifically, the CIA positioned ahong, Islamic authorities, as the spokespeople of party policy and socialist law. By the late 1990s, violence between Uyghurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang had become a constant in everyday life in the westernmost province. In 1999, there were a reported sixteen incidents in Xinjiang (Bovingdon 2002b, 186-188 While political and academic discourses that produce shariʿa as customary law continue to the present day, the CIA has stepped up its efforts to instill "patriotic education" in ahong through both formal instruction and state-sanctioned weekly prayer From the above teachings derived from the classics, we can grasp that Islam advocates unity and opposes division. Unity is the virtue of us Muslims, it is the core of one family, one collective, one society, and the source of Muslims' strength. The early Muslims obeyed the commands of Allah and the teachings of the Prophet. They were of universal agreement in creating, in the history of humanity, the great Islamic civilization. With the lapse of time, we cannot fail to see that there are a few among us for whom the scriptures' call for unity and opposition to division has faded from memory. (Chen 2003, 90) If the authorities of Islam (i.e., Allah, the Prophet, scriptures) are replaced by the "state," the sermon recalls earlier Leninist techniques of the "mass line" that used persuasion, exhortation, and propaganda to create solidarity vis-à-vis class (Lubman 1999, 42) or, in this case, sinful and divisive "enemies." Rather than use Maoist slogans to raise class consciousness or glorify the proletariat, the CIA sermons employ the language of Islam to elevate shariʿa consciousness among Chinese Muslims as interpreted through the lens of socialism. The result of either is to unite followers under the authority of the party that itself has undergone significant transformation over the last 
Conclusion
In reform China, while the official policy is religious freedom, the state tightly regulates all aspects of religious life. For Muslims, whereas state law recognizes aspects of shariʿa, mainly dietary rules, and allows Muslims to exercise ritual aspects of shariʿa, including ablutions, prayer, and recitation, other aspects of shariʿa, including those pertaining to family matters (e.g., marriage, divorce, inheritance, and property) fail to receive protection under state law. Thus, the experience of Muslim minorities in China is a state policy that is not neutral (as Western liberal states claim to be) but of selective recognition, if not hostility. Nonetheless, even in authoritarian China, the state has turned to religious authorities, including ahong, to supplement party rule.
The China case shows an arc of legal pluralism. Beginning in the 1950s and heightening in the decade of the Cultural Revolution, the state sought to excoriate religious law, including shariʿa. During this period, shariʿa became naturalized as "customary law," a parochial and ethnic-bound set of apolitical rules. The CIA was established to communicate state law and party policy to Muslim communities, but its role in the public sphere was sharply limited. Next, with the reforms in the 1980s, the discursive denigration of shariʿa continued with only a gradual relaxation as ahong studied abroad in Muslim countries, more Chinese performed the hajj, and economic ties between China and the Middle East grew stronger. The CIA's position increased in importance as the state sought to depoliticize sermons and shariʿa itself by monopolizing their definitions.
Finally, after the late 1990s, a period of turmoil in Xinjiang, and the aftermath of 9/11 on the international response to "terrorism," the state has operationalized shariʿa for secular rule. Muslims comply with the speech and model of the charismatic authority of They were influenced by external separatist forces [jingwai fenlie shili 境 外分裂势力]. The external and internal structures colluded to beat, smash, loot, torch, and kill. So this is not a religious problem, and it is not an ethnic problem. Rather, it's a deeply rooted struggle between separatism and counterseparatism and safeguarding the national unity and undermining the national unity. (Zhang 2010) Through such communications, charisma, as embodied in the authority of Chen Guangyuan, becomes, as Weber remarked, "part of everyday life" ([1922] 1978b, 1123) for Muslim minorities in reform-era China.
None of the above, however, is to conclude that postsecularism as governance is one-way, inevitable, hegemonic, or even wholly effective. The party-state's approach to governing Islam through Muslim elites and a selective translation of shariʿa faces several problems. The limits of the postsecular are seen, for example, in the failure of the EAGC to gain widespread support. Most ahong and almost all Hui scholars discredit the EAGC as China's ulama, citing the committee members' lack of credentials to interpret shariʿa.
The tongxun no longer circulate and are nearly impossible to find in China. Ironically, their material has most likely been rendered too sensitive and therefore been censored by state religious authorities. As a result, the EAGC has stopped producing the tongxun. An exception, of course, is the rules of succession that may be rooted in a formal procedure of rules (e.g., the succession of the Dalai Lama) or may remain simply a function of the individual choice of the charismatic leader (Weber [1922 (Weber [ ] 1978a Ahong is the Chinese transliteration of the Persian word meaning "the learned." Note that ahong were mosque leaders before the CCP's assumption of power and for most of Islam's history in China. 8
The term xiguan 习惯 has a long genealogy in legal modernization in China. The Communists borrowed the term from the Republicans who ruled China from 1911 to 1949 and who, in turn, adapted the concept from late-Qing legal reformers who themselves received the word from Japanese jurists (Dicks 1990, 366-367; Bourgon 2005 ). 9
General Regulations of the China Islamic Association (Zhongguo Yisilanjiao xiehui jianzhang 中国伊斯兰教协会简章), passed May 11, 1953. In accordance with broader shifts in party-state reform from the 1950s to the 1980s, the name of the governing rules was changed from the Soviet-sounding "General Regulations" (jianzhang 简章) to the more globally fashionable "Constitution" (zhangcheng 章 The incidents range from gunfights and stabbings to religious incitement and organized protests. Most incidents involved a handful of people; others, such as the riot in Lop on August 9, 1999, involved some six thousand people (Bovingdon 2002b, 187) . 17
Scholarship has, accordingly, concentrated on state policy in Xinjiang following 9/11, with particular reference, for example, to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO was founded in 2001 in Shanghai by its members, including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The multilateral organization coordinates security, military, and economic affairs in the region and has consistently identified antiterrorism measures as one of its unifying objectives (Bovingdon 2002b; Gladney 2004a; Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004) . 18
The EAGC was formed on April 23, 2001, and thus its establishment predated the 9/11 attacks; however, the committee appears to have taken on greater significance following the Chinese government's response to perceived terrorist activity in Xinjiang. 21 The standard argument is that because the Yihewani "teaching school" endorses a modernist vision of Islam and opposes the practices of Sufis, such as veneration of the saint, it has received greater support from the state than Sufi or Salafiyya groups. 22
Quran 3:103.
